


14

A HISTORY OF
ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

SECOND EDITION




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2002

 CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

INTRODUCTION: MODERNITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MUSLIM SOCIETIES



By the eighteenth century a worldwide system of Muslim societies had come into being. Each was built upon the interaction of Middle Eastern Islamic state, religious, and communal institutions, and local social institutions and cultures, and in each case the interactions generated a different type of Islamic society. Though each society was unique, they resembled each other in form and were interconnected by political and religious contacts and shared values. Thus they made up a world system of Islamic societies.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the evolution of these societies was diverted by European intervention. By the late eighteenth century the Russians, the Dutch, and the British had established territorial suzerainty in parts of the northern steppes of Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, and European commercial and diplomatic intervention was well advanced in other regions. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European states, driven by the need of industrial economies for raw materials and markets, and by economic and political competition with each other, established worldwide territorial empires. The Dutch completed the conquest of Indonesia; the Russians (and the Chinese) absorbed Inner Asia; the British consolidated their empires in India and Malaya, and took control of parts of the Middle East, East Africa, Nigeria, and other parts of West Africa. France seized North Africa and much of West Africa, parts of the Middle East, and other territories. Small German and Italian colonies were also founded in Africa. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the European powers (and China) had completed their conquest of almost all of the Muslim world.

These conquests were driven by rapid changes within European societies. The Industrial Revolution in Britain in the eighteenth century, and in France, Germany, and other countries in the nineteenth, the development of bureaucratic forms of economic organization, new technologies for the production of steam and electricity, and the expansion of scientific knowledge further enhanced the economic dominance of European countries.



21 The Muharram Procession, Calcutta

The American and French revolutions brought equally profound changes in the realm of politics and statecraft. They brought into being the modern nation-state built upon the relative equality and participation of its citizens, close identification of populations with the state, and a merging of national, political, and cultural identities. They also pioneered in the creation of parliamentary institutions that allowed for widespread political representation, and state structures that diffused or moderated the exercise of power in the interests of the autonomy of the civil society and the political freedom of individual citizens.


Furthermore, the European and American Enlightenments completed the historical process of secularization. Political and economic institutions were fully differentiated from religious norms. The cultivation of scientific and of humanistic mentalities relegated religion to a narrowed sphere of worship and communal activities. The scientific mentality "disenchanted" and demystified the world of nature and of human relations. Nature, society, and even the human personality became accessible to rational understanding and to the conviction that they could be modified by conscious human intervention.

Throughout the Muslim world European dominance led to the construction of centralized bureaucratic territorial states. European economic and capitalist penetration usually led to increased and often exploitative trade, stimulated the production of raw materials, and undermined local industries. The European powers forced or induced others to create modern schools, and to promote the values of European civilization, blended as best they could be with indigenous cultures. These changes in non-European societies involved the creation of new patterns of economic production and exchange and new technologies. In turn the new state and economic structures were the bases for the rise of new elites. Political managers, soldiers, technocrats, comprador merchants, intelligentsia, intellectuals, commercial farmers, and industrial workers became important forces in Muslim societies. European influence also stimulated the acceptance of new value systems – an appreciation for national identity and political participation, economic engagement, moral activism, and a new scientific world-view. All of these changes involved the adoption or recreation of the basic features of European civilization in the matrix of older Islamic societies.

In each case, however, the European impact was different – and these differences, combined with the institutional and cultural variations among the Muslim societies, would generate the various contemporary Islamic societies. Just as each Islamic society was the product of the interaction of a regional society with Middle Eastern influences, modern Islamic countries are the products of the interaction of the historical Islamic societies with Europe. Such transformations, of course, were not peculiar to the Muslim world. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European influence reached all civilizations, provoked profound changes, and helped shape their contemporary development.

The result was a multiplicity of societies, because there was no single European model of modern society, and because the impact of Europe was different in every

Map 28 European domination and the Muslim world: c. 1920



part of the world. Like the great empires, religions, and civilizations of the past, Europe challenged existing elites, institutions, and cultures and forced them to define their own version of modernity. Modernity engendered plurality because it resulted from the efforts of Third World indigenous elites to reconstruct their own societies.

The role of indigenous elites, institutions, and cultures in determining the pattern of development must be emphasized because of some important differences between Muslim and European societies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European societies were to a considerable extent organized in terms of economically derived social classes. In many European countries bourgeois elites were the principal forces behind economic development, state organization, and world conquest. Industrial working classes were a principal force in production. In Muslim societies economically defined social classes were relatively less significant. In these societies, the economy was embedded in and regulated by tribal, communal, associational, and state political structures. State elites – and tribal and religious notables – used political power to control land and trading resources and to extract the surplus product of peasants and other producers.

The impact of Europe on Muslim societies was mediated by the collaboration or resistance of these elites. The changes that took place in Muslim societies were forged in terms of the interests, perceptions, and responses of internal elites to the pressures and incentives generated by European power and by their desire to exploit European influences in the struggle for power within their own societies. Whatever the economic forces that impinged from without, in Muslim countries these elites had primarily a political or cultural orientation, and tended to define the problem of European intervention in sociocultural rather than economic terms. In Muslim societies economic influences commonly led to political and cultural responses. Thus, indigenous elites, institutions, and cultural codes were as important to the shape of modernity as were European imperial and economic systems.

The history of the modern transformation of Islamic societies falls into several phases and shows certain common features throughout the Muslim world. The first phase was the period from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, marked by the breakup of the Muslim state system and the imposition of European commercial and territorial domination. In this phase Muslim political, religious, and tribal elites attempted to define new ideological and religious approaches to the internal development of their own societies. Out of these responses came a second phase of development, the twentieth-century formation of national states through which the elites of Muslim countries tried to give a modern political identity to their societies and to promote economic development and social change. The phase of national state building began after World War I and persists to the present. The consolidation of independent national states in turn introduced a third phase in the development of almost all Muslim countries: the rise of Islamist or Islamic revival movements and conflict over the ultimate role of Islam in the development of these societies.

ISLAMIC MODERNISM

In almost all Muslim regions colonial rule brought new elites to the fore. Political power was taken from the hands of old elites and transferred to a new stratum of military, bureaucratic, or landowning intelligentsia – and in some countries, in a later generation, to upwardly mobile, modern-educated, middle- and lower-class intellectuals, technicians, and soldiers. In a limited number of cases the economic changes induced by European penetration promoted new strata of merchants, commercial farmers, and industrial workers. All of these new groups and classes were at first very small in size. They were the vanguard of the modernization of their societies.

These elites generated two principal responses to European pressures. One was the response of the political classes and of newly formed intelligentsias trained in Western techniques and enamored of Western cultural values and accomplishments. They favored Islamic modernist or secular nationalist concepts of the future of Muslim societies, and tended to redefine Islam to make it consistent with European forms of state and economy. The second response came from tribal leaders, merchants, and commercial farmers led by 'ulama' and Sufis, who espoused a reorganization of Muslim communities and the reform of individual behavior in terms of fundamental religious principles.

The Muslim response of course differed from place to place. In the Ottoman regions, Turkey, Egypt, the Arab fertile crescent, and Tunisia, the dominant indigenous response was that of the established political elites and the political, technical, and literary intelligentsia who rose out of the political classes. In these regions European influence was primarily diplomatic, commercial, and educational. The rivalry of the European powers in the nineteenth century allowed the Ottoman empire to survive, but made it dependent upon British and Russian diplomatic pressures and later upon German military advisors and investors. European traders extracted raw materials, and introduced European manufactures in competition with indigenous merchants and artisans. Europeans stimulated the production of cash crops such as grain, dried fruit, and cotton in Anatolia, opium in Iran, silk in the Lebanon, cotton in Egypt, and olive oil in Tunisia, and generally depressed the handicrafts and manufacturing industries. European trade promoted Christian and Jewish middlemen and depressed the opportunities of Muslim merchants. Europeans also invested in railroads, mining, and agriculture. European states and banks lent large sums to the Ottoman empire, Egypt, and Tunisia, and eventually established a foreign fiscal administration in each country. In Egypt and Tunisia this proved to be the basis for European protectorates. In the Ottoman empire, European competition weakened the Muslim bourgeoisie and helped concentrate economic power in the hands of the state elites.

The response of the political elites and intelligentsias went through a cycle of several generations. In late eighteenth-century Palestine, the early nineteenth-century Ottoman empire and Egypt, and mid-nineteenth-century Tunisia, the political elites

sought to reorganize their military forces, centralize and rationalize bureaucratic administration, and promote economic activities that would increase state revenues. Political elites also recognized the need to create new schools to educate modern professional and administrative personnel. In the next "generation," Ottoman, Egyptian, and Tunisian reformers appreciated the connection between a strong state and a productive and socially integrated society, and introduced social, legal, and educational programs which undermined the traditional roles of the religious elites and created the prototypes of modern judicial and educational systems.

The formation of new intelligentsias was a critical outcome of the reform programs. In the Ottoman case, a new "generation" of Western-educated physicians, engineers, army and navy officers, and administrators was the product of professional schools and of studies in Europe. These Western-educated cadres were partially absorbed into state service, but many of them found careers in law, journalism, and literary activities, and attempted to win control of the state.

The reform program in Egypt was unusual in the degree to which the state attempted to control the economy. Muhammad 'Ali (1805-48) improved irrigation, stimulated cotton production, created trading monopolies, and invested in factories to produce military supplies. Extensive economic change created a new landowning and bureaucratic class whose scions became officials, lawyers, journalists, and politicians in the late nineteenth century. With the establishment of British rule in 1882, the domestic elites lost control of the state and were forced into lower bureaucratic functions, the liberal professions, and journalism, and from these positions formed a national movement opposed to British rule.

In the Arab fertile crescent, European political influence and commercial penetration did not lead to structural and political changes until after World War I, but educational and literary influences in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century promoted an Arab cultural renaissance and the birth of Arab literary nationalism. In Lebanon and Syria the new intelligentsia was the product of European and modernized late Ottoman education. The formation of dependent colonial states in 1920 provoked the coalescence of an opposition intelligentsia which included Ottoman and Western-educated soldiers and officials, landowners, religious notables, and sometimes tribal chiefs and merchants. By the 1930s and 1940s further education and development had created a new generation of soldiers, technocrats, and journalists from middle- and lower-middle-class backgrounds who would rival the first generation of national leaders.

Tunisia went through a similar developmental sequence. Before the establishment of the French protectorate in 1881 the principal reaction to European economic domination came from officials who attempted to modernize and rationalize the Tunisian regime. After the establishment of the French protectorate successive generations of Western- and modern-Muslim-educated Tunisians took the lead in resisting European control and demanding political rights. From approximately 1890 to 1920 domestic leadership was provided by government officials, reformist 'ulama', and French-edu-

cated notables. In the 1930s and after, a new generation of Arab French-educated upwardly mobile intellectuals, largely from provincial small-town, middle-, and lower-class milieus, took the lead in the movement for Tunisian independence.

In all of these cases, 'ulama' and merchants played only a secondary role. 'Ulama' were auxiliaries or participants in the early phases of national movements in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, but were soon superseded by the Western-educated intelligentsias. Not until the 1930s did structural changes in the economy or sufficiently far-reaching changes in class structure generate a politically significant merchant or working class which could play an important political role. In no case did these new milieus disturb the dominance of the Western-educated political intelligentsias.

In other Muslim regions similar intelligentsias came into being without the mediation of the old-regime state elites and internal programs of reform, but as a result of direct European rule, the displacement of former political elites from their governing positions, and their subordination to colonial administrators. In India, British control deprived the Muslim elites of political power, generated economic changes that weakened the grip of Muslim landlords on rural revenues, and threatened to undermine Muslim culture. In response, the displaced Muslim political elite transformed itself into a modern intelligentsia. Under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), they founded a college at Aligarh and defined a modern Islamic education to train a new generation of officials, lawyers, and journalists. After the turn of the century Aligarh graduates became the leaders of Muslim resistance to British rule and, ultimately, the proponents of Pakistan.

In Indonesia, Dutch rule similarly transformed the historical ruling classes, the *priyayi*, into subordinate functionaries of Dutch administration. The Dutch themselves provided the former elites with a Western professional education in order to generate the Indonesian cadres who were needed to maintain Dutch administration. From Dutch-sponsored colleges and technical, legal, and medical schools came the officials and intellectuals who became the advocates of Indonesian national independence.

In almost all Muslim countries politicians, displaced politicians, would-be politicians, professionals, technicians, and intellectuals trained in Western techniques sought to define new political ideologies for the development of their societies. In successive generations the political elites and intelligentsias adopted Islamic modernist, secular nationalist, and sometimes socialist conceptions of national transformation.

Islamic modernism was the nineteenth-century doctrine of Muslim political elites and intelligentsias, and must be distinguished from Islamic reformism, which was a doctrine of the 'ulama'. The essential principle of Islamic modernism was that the defeat of Muslims at the hands of European powers had revealed their vulnerability, and that borrowing European military techniques, centralizing state power, modernizing their economies, and providing a modern education for their elites was essential for the restoration of their political power. It meant that the medieval

forms of Islamic civilization had to be repudiated – but not that Islam itself was to be denied. Rather, it was to be reconstructed on its own inherent, but neglected, principles of rationality, ethical activism, and patriotism.

The modernist point of view was first espoused by the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and 1870s. While committed to the principles of Islam, they called upon the endangered Ottoman regime to transform itself into a constitutional government and to promote a new social morality and revived culture based on a simplified Turkish language. Similarly, in India Sayyid Ahmad Khan argued that the survival of Indian Muslims under British rule required the education of a new generation of Muslim leaders loyal to the principles of Islam but adapted to the political and scientific culture of the modern world. While the Ottoman and Indian intelligentsias were concerned with local situations, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) proselytized for an international union of Muslim peoples committed to the modernization of Islam and to political unity in the face of colonial oppression. Islamic modernism, then, was the ideology of elites who were concerned with the restoration of state power in terms of the indigenous social and cultural bases of political power.

The commitment of the intelligentsias to Islamic modernism was followed by a move to secular nationalism. In the Ottoman empire the Young Turks succeeded the Young Ottomans. In reaction to the pan-Islamic policies of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1908) they turned from an Islamic modernist to a secular constitutionalist position. In Tunisia, the first-generation elites blended Islamic modernist and secular orientations, but were followed in the 1930s by a revived independence movement that was articulated mainly in secular nationalist terms, despite making symbolic appeals to Islam. In the Arab countries, at the end of World War I, the Damascus notables changed their emphasis from an Islamic to an Arab orientation. In Egypt, the first generation of modernist intelligentsia was superseded by secular liberal political parties. In India the Aligarh graduates were secular and modernist in lifestyle and personal religious orientation, but for reasons peculiar to the subcontinent developed a commitment to the formation of a "Muslim" national state. Only in Indonesia did the priyayi bypass the Islamic modernist phase and enter directly into a secular nationalist literary and political opposition to Dutch rule. In Indonesia, the shallow integration of Islamic values into the historical cultural orientation of the political elite helps to explain the immediate adoption of secular nationalism. In Algeria, whose migrant workers in France and rural migrants to Algerian towns formed the popular base of Algerian national movements, and in Indonesia, where the workers' movement and the Communist Party were particularly strong, nationalism was blended with socialist conceptions of state control of the economy. In general, Young Turks, Arab nationalists, pan-Turkish intellectuals, Malay aristocrats, and others set aside the Muslim dimension of their political and cultural heritage to espouse the formation of secular national types of modern society.

Nationalism came to be the preferred doctrine of the political elites and modern-educated intelligentsias for several reasons. Foremost was the influence of a West-

ern education. Though opposed to colonial rule the first- and second-generation intelligentsias were raised in the intense glow of self-confident European supremacy, and absorbed the nationalist convictions of their colonial rulers and instructors. National and secular symbols were also particularly meaningful to a segment of society that had been uprooted from local affiliations and cast into a world of cosmopolitan education and state-centered political movements. An independent national state was the only potential homeland for people who no longer belonged to their old communities and for whom colonial political societies could only offer subordinate positions.

There were also tactical reasons for the adoption of secular nationalism as the ideology of political intelligentsias. The nationalist position helped differentiate the new segments of an intelligentsia from the established elites, and could serve as a mobilizing symbol in the competition for the support of other uprooted strata of society and as a claim to leadership of the masses. In the Ottoman empire Young Turks used the new ideology against the pan-Islamic claims of the Sultan and in opposition to more conservative and entrenched Ottoman officials. In Lebanon and Syria, nationalism was the preferred position of Christians in predominantly Muslim societies. In Tunisia, Arab French-educated intellectuals used nationalism against the established reformist oriented elites of Tunis. In Indonesia, priyayi nationalism developed partially in opposition to Muslim merchant reformist movements. Nationalism also served better than Islamic modernism to symbolize the ambiguous relationship between Muslim intelligentsias and colonial political domination. On the one hand, secularism and nationalism signified that the intelligentsias were the advanced elements of their societies and justified their demand to participate in colonial regimes. On the other hand, nationalism also legitimized resistance to foreign rule in the eyes of Europeans as well as Muslims.

ISLAMIC REFORMISM

While political elites and intelligentsias became committed to Islamic modernist, secularist, and nationalist concepts of society, an alternative set of responses came from the 'ulama' and allied merchant, artisan, and tribal milieus. In many Muslim countries the 'ulama' opposed both colonial influences and the state intelligentsias. In Iran and Indonesia the opposition came from the conventional scholars. In Iran, Russian territorial expansion and Russian and British economic penetration – in the form of monopolies and concessions, investments in mining, irrigation, and banks, and heavy loans to the Shah – met with a double response. While the state elites made attempts to modernize the military and administrative apparatus and, through new professional schools and the education of Iranians abroad, to create a small intelligentsia, the Shi'i 'ulama' protested against Russian military expansion, foreign economic penetration, and the military, administrative, and educational reform programs of the monarchy. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a coalition of

Table 16. Muslim reform (tajdid) movements, eighteenth to twentieth centuries

Arabia	Reform teaching in Mecca and Medina Wahhabiya – founded by Muhammad b. Abd. al-Wahhab (1703–92); allied with Ibn Sa'ud to create Sa'udi state Idrisiya – founded in Mecca by Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837) Naqshbandiya – 1785–present, anti-Russian resistance Naqshbandiya – reform-oriented Sufi tariqa leads Muslim resistance to Russia and China New teaching, 1761–1877 – offshoot of Naqshbandiya, late eighteenth- and late nineteenth-century resistance to Chinese rule Khwajana and Ya qub Beg – holy Muslim lineage, formerly rulers of Kashgar, attempt to establish a Muslim state, defeated by China in 1878 Yunnan, 1856–73 – rebellion against Chinese rule and effort to establish a Muslim state <i>usul-i jadid</i> – Kazan, Crimean, and Bukharan intellectuals, notably Isma'il Gasprinskii (1851–1914), sponsor new schools, combined Muslim and Russian education; modernization of Muslim peoples
India	Shah Waliullah (1703–62) Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (1746–1824) Muhammad Isma'il (1781–1831) Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1785–1831) unites Pathans to resist British and Sikhs Patna-Maulana Wailayat 'Ali Maulana Karamat 'Ali Titu Mir (Bengal) and anti-British Delhi School Deoband – founded 1876. Muslim college combined hadith studies and Sufism and spawned satellite schools Tablighi Islam – founded 1927 by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Padri Movement – Sumatra 1803–37 Diponegara leads revolt on Java, 1825–30 Banten, West Java revolts, nineteenth century Kaum Muda – Sumatra and Malaya movement for reform and modernization Acheh – 1873–1908 ulama-led resistance to Dutch occupation Muhammadiya – 1912–present; educational and social reform Abd al-Qadir – Qadiriya chief aims attempts to establish Algerian State, defeated by the French Rahmaniya – religious brotherhood uses networks of zawiyas in Algeria and Tunisia to resist French occupation Tijaniya – reform Sufi order inspires West and North African jihads and resistance movements Khalwatiya – reformist Sufi brotherhood Sanusiya – reformist brotherhood creates "state" in Libya, founded by Muhammad b. Ali al-Sanusi (d. 1859); resists Italian occupation Salafiya – founded by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), influenced Islam and national movements in North Africa; Tunisia, Young Tunisians; Algeria; Ben Badis; Morocco, Allal al-Fasi
Southeast Asia	
Egypt and North Africa	

Table 16. — Continued

East Africa	Idrisiya spawned Rashidiya in Algeria; Amirghaniya in Sudan and Nubia; Sanusiya in Libya Sudan – Sammaniya gives rise to Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Mahdi (d. 1898) Somalia – Muhammad Abdallah Hassan leads resistance to British, 1899–1920 Jihad of Uthman Don Fodio (1754–1817) – Northern Nigerian reformist opposition to Hausa states Sokoto Caliphate (1809–1903) and related jihads in Adamawa and Masina Al-Hajj Umar (1794–1864) – jihad state in region of Mali and Senegal Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro, reform Muslim states in the Senegambian region Ma Ba – nineteenth-century jihad in Senegal Samory (1860s–98) – Muslim adventurer founds West African state
West Africa	

Tijani order, spread in Algeria, Morocco, and West Africa, and interacted with local forces to inspire the formation of the regime of al-Hajj 'Umar (1794?–1864) in the regions from the Niger to Senegal. In Libya, the Sanusiya unified tribal peoples and created a loose confederation of tribes and oases which served to mediate disputes and to organize trade. Reformism also became the basis of the local struggle against colonialism in the Caucasus and Inner Asia, where the Naqshbandi order became the bearer of new religious inspiration and, ultimately, of political resistance to both Russian and Chinese expansion. In the Indian Northwest Frontier, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi tried to organize the Pashtuns against the British and the Sikhs on the basis of reformist teaching.

Second, reformism took root in agricultural and urban merchant milieus, in direct response to European political intervention and economic changes. In Bengal the reformist Fara'idi movement was associated with the introduction of British rule and the rise of Hindu and British landlords. In northern India, British rule and the collapse of the Mughal empire led to reform movements in urban and small-town middle-class milieus. Based at Deoband, reformist 'ulama' created a network of colleges which trained cadres to proselytize, educate, and make true Muslims out of Indian believers. Deoband and subsequent reformist movements in India contributed heavily to the creation of a sense of Muslim identity throughout the subcontinent.

In Southeast Asia there were successive waves of reformism. The early nineteenth-century Padri movement in Sumatra was associated with the commercialization of coffee production. Coffee farmers were receptive to the influence of the reformist pilgrims and scholars returning to Sumatra from Mecca and Medina, who launched a movement to Islamize Muslim villages. At the end of the nineteenth century reformism became the creed of the Indo-Malay merchant communities of Singapore and other Southeast Asian ports. Enlarged world trade, pilgrimage, the creation of a capitalist plantation economy in Sumatra and Malaya producing rubber, coffee, tobacco, pepper, sugar, pineapples, and palm oil for export, the formation of a plantation and mining proletariat, commercialization, urbanization, and other

forces of socio-economic change broke down traditional family and social structures, favored the growth of a Muslim merchant class in Singapore and other island ports, and of commercial planters in Sumatra and Malaya, and led to the adoption of Muslim reformism as the doctrine of new communities. These and similar milieus were the basis of the early twentieth-century Muhammadiyah movement in Indonesia and the Kaum Muda (Young Group) in Malaya. In Inner Asia, merchants and intellectuals adopted *usul-i jadid* (the New Method) in response to Russian domination, and the need to revitalize a threatened Muslim community.

Reformism could be blended with Muslim modernism. An Egyptian scholar, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), combined reformist principles – return to the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, the right of independent judgment in religious matters, abandonment of a stifling conformity to outmoded tradition, and opposition to cultic Sufi practices – with a modernist responsiveness to the political and cultural pressures of Europe. These movements were devoted to the reform of education as a correction to shrine and saint worship and magical religious practices, and were committed to the need for adjustment to modern economic and technological conditions. They were latently, and sometimes actively, political, in that they cultivated a consciousness of the need for autonomy from European powers if the vitality of Islamic states and societies was to be restored. This blend of modernist and reformist thought inspired the Salafi movement in Egypt, the Arab Middle East, and North Africa. In North Africa the Salafi movement became the principal ideological expression of the merchant bourgeoisie of Fez and other Moroccan towns in the 1920s, and in Morocco and Algeria reformism transcended specific class milieus and became for a time the ideology of national identity and resistance to French rule.

In short, Islamic reformism was the political and moral response of 'ulama', tribal, and urban communities to the transformation of the traditional structures of Muslim societies and to the threat of European political, economic, and cultural domination. It had its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in response, not to European pressures, but to purely internal conditions, and it was later adapted to anti-colonial resistance. Reformism appealed to tribal societies seeking political unification and to merchant and farmer milieus undergoing commercialization and urbanization where reformist doctrine provided a cultural basis for larger-scale communities. Though often politically passive, reformism contributed to the psychological mobilization of colonized peoples and became the vehicle for the reconstruction of Muslim political identity among sub-national populations in the Caucasus, Inner Asia, India, and Indonesia and the basis for national movements in Algeria and Morocco.

Patterns of response and resistance

Thus the two principal responses to the breakdown of Muslim societies and to European penetration came from the political intelligentsias and the 'ulama', and

represented, despite modifications, a striking continuity in the structures of Islamic societies. In societies with a strong heritage of state domination over the 'ulama', such as the Ottoman empire and Turkey, the political intelligentsia led the way, unopposed, to national independence; but in the more pluralist Muslim societies colonial rule precipitated a multi-sided struggle for power waged against the colonial rulers and among the various Islamic modernist secularist, nationalist, socialist, and Muslim traditional and reformist elites. In Iran, a society with a more open political structure, foreign pressures promoted a limited modernization of the state and collusion between government elites and foreign business interests, but it damaged Iranian merchant and artisan interests and 'ulama' cultural security, and provoked a coalition of 'ulama', merchant, and intellectual opposition to foreign encroachment. The result was direct conflict between state and religious elites over Iranian national identity, policies of economic development, and foreign relations.

Similarly, in India the loss of political power, economic dominance, and cultural supremacy to English and Christian rulers provoked a multiple Muslim response. From the displaced political elites, transformed by modern education into an intelligentsia, came a movement for the formation of a national Muslim state in the subcontinent. From reformist 'ulama' came repeated efforts to define the identity of an Indian Muslim population in terms of personal religious values.

Indonesia was also the center of a complex struggle among forces that had different experiences of colonial rule, different class and status interests, different historical variants of Indonesian Islamic culture, and different responses to the problems of colonialism and economic change. The priyayi were transformed by Dutch education into a secularized intelligentsia who took the lead in the Indonesian nationalist movement, while reformism became the preferred ideology of merchants and commercial farmers. In the more traditional, less disrupted parts of Java, 'ulama' (kiyayi) maintained their leadership in the countryside and led peasant resistance against Dutch rule. Indonesian politics before and since independence has been characterized by a struggle for political and ideological power among Indonesian nationalist, reformist Muslim, and conservative Muslim movements.

Algerian society similarly evinced a plural response to French occupation and colonization. The French destroyed the traditional society, but in the 1920s and 1930s urbanization and migration to the towns was the basis for the formation of a new Algerian elite. This elite was divided into three segments: the French-educated Algerians who favored cultural and political assimilation into France and the acceptance of Muslims as citizens of France; reformist 'ulama' who appealed to the petite bourgeoisie of the towns and to certain rural populations, and attempted to define an Algerian national identity in Arab and Muslim terms; and populist leaders who organized Algerian workers, both at home and in France, into a radical political movement. By the late 1940s all of these movements had failed to make significant progress toward Algerian independence, and a new generation of revolutionary soldiers took the lead in throwing off French colonialism and establishing an

independent Algerian state. The new Algerian state nonetheless came to be defined by past elements of Islamic reformism and populist socialism.

Thus, in most Muslim societies the struggle among political intelligentsias, 'ulama', and other elites has given political and cultural definition to modern Muslim national states. The continuity of historic elites, institutions, and cultures in the "modernization" of these societies meant that in each Muslim country the universal features of economy and technology were expressed, organized, and interrelated in ways that yielded different versions of modernity.

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