ABSTRACT


Today about 85 per cent of the world's Muslim population live outside the Arab world and due to population growth, 'missionary' (da'wa) endeavours, and migration, the number of Muslims in non-Arab nations is rapidly increasing. Yet many people in the West conceive of Islam as an 'Arab' religion and it is only recently that a more thorough scholarly interest in other parts of the Muslim world has emerged. This volume presents the spread and character of Islam in many non-Arab countries in Africa (south of the Sahara), Asia, Oceania, Europe, and the Americas. It focuses particularly on the contemporary situation, but also presents an historical background. Much attention is devoted to Sufism, which appears to be the predominant form of Islam in most non-Arab countries, as well as to the growing significance of Islamism, which challenges both secularism and the Sufi forms of Islam. An extensive introduction provides a general background account of the origin, expansion, and characteristics of Islam.

ISLAM
OUTSIDE THE ARAB WORLD

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Chapter Six

Turkey

Svante Cornell and Ingvar Svannberg

The events from 1994 to the present day have accentuated the inherent difficulties of the Turkish state's relationship with religion. First of all, religion has re-emerged in the open in society in a way unseen since the republic was proclaimed in 1923. The tension between secularists and Islamists in the political sphere has increased, and polarisation seems on the increase throughout society. Deeper in society, the sectarian fragmentation of Islam is possibly growing, and certainly more publicised than ever. The Turkish public, which on the whole – this is especially true for the secular establishment – has a poor knowledge of Islam both generally and in Turkey, is suddenly exposed to extensive media coverage of the activities of Islamist groups. Moreover, the existence of a non-Sunni minority of Alevis which may compose up to one third of the population of the country was news to many Turks, not to mention foreigners. As mainly foreign observers are warning of an Islamic revolt or a development of the Algerian type, Turks are quick to explain that Turkey is not Algeria. However, there is a very poor awareness of Islam in Turkey, as well as in Europe, although scholarly interest is increasing. In Turkey, this ignorance has led to the spontaneous support for the military-led efforts to suppress religious radicals and conservatives, which many secularists adopt without questioning its virtues and drawbacks.

Historical background

Since 1923, Turkey has been a heavily Western-orientated secular republic. The role of Islam in society has varied with the political leadership of the state. However, in general it can be said that the main tendency has been a constant pressure from large parts of the population to lend more importance to Islam, whereas this has been resisted by the secular elite, a policy warranted by the strongly secularist army. In terms of history, Turkey's relation to Islam can be called a U-turn. Turkey is the main successor state of the Ottoman Empire, which was based not on an ethnic identity but on the religious identity of Islam. The sultan of the empire was also the caliph, the spiritual leader of all Muslims in the world. By contrast,
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the republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 was based on the concept of Turkish ethnicity and staunchly rejecting of religion. However, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic cannot be termed a ‘U-turn’ of the 1920s. The Westernisation of the Ottoman Empire began in the middle of the nineteenth century. Throughout the century, the empire had suffered an increasingly rapid disintegration, with not only its European parts but also sub-sequently its Middle Eastern provinces rising up in nationalist rebellions, eagerly supported by its numerous enemies; and nationalism was the concept the Ottoman Empire was particularly ill-fit to tackle. It recognised minorities – but only religious minorities – through the millet system, whereby the religious minorities had a significant level of autonomy. As an answer to these developments, an awareness grew in the empire that it had lagged behind the West. An urge for modernisation emerged, as the empire was seen to be in rapid decay. This urge for modernisation was paralleled by a movement which saw reform as necessary not only in regard to the state and military but also to the entire society. A national project was necessary to prevent the total dissolution of the empire. Among the military elites, a movement known as the ‘young Ottomans’, or later ‘young Turks’, emerged, which sought a thorough transformation of the society and state. Ziya Gökalp, the author of Türkçülük Eşasları (The Essence of Turkism), is often credited as one of the earliest and most influential theorists of Turkish nationalism. His motto was ‘Türkifı, İslamı ve Modernizı’, a blueprint for a modern Turkish identity, still heavily coloured by Islam. However, inspired by European practices, Gökalp also promoted the separation of Islam from the state. This illustrates the fact that modernisation in Turkey since the times of the Ottoman Empire has been equated with Westernisation.

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of confusion, where the social structure of the empire was challenged by refugee flows and a generally chaotic external environment. As nationalist, separatist forces among minorities were strengthened, Islamic militancy increased among the Muslim population; and as tensions between religious groups grew, Russia, France and Great Britain claimed a role as protectors of religious minorities in the empire – a notable humiliation for the sultan. Furthermore, with the dismantling of the European parts of the empire, large refugee flows of Muslims from these areas were migrating to the Anatolian heartland, which increased the Islamic demographic character of Anatolia, which until then had been largely multi-cultural. The official religion of the empire was Hanafi Sunni. The religious hierarchy was strict and represented a normative Sunnism, which guided education and the judiciary. Sub orders were viewed with suspicion and restricted by the state. Nevertheless, their strength increased during the last decades of the empire. This was particularly true for the Naqshbandis, Qadiri, Bektashi and Rifa'i orders.
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understood context of these movements. Hence the orders interactions and have recently seen a resurgence. Atatürk's reforms have often been interpreted as an attempt to eradicate Islam from Turkish society, which is not accurate. Atatürk's policies were aimed at modernizing Turkey and secularizing its society, not eliminating Islam. Islam has always been an integral part of Turkish culture and society. The Atatürk era saw the establishment of a secular state and the promotion of education in the secular sphere. Atatürk's policies were implemented in the 1920s and 1930s under his leadership, with the aim of modernizing Turkey and separating religion and politics, a move that is still debated and discussed in Turkey.

Religion and political culture in Turkey

Despite the Atatürk's secular character of Turkish society, this change is limited in certain aspects. In the aftermath of Atatürk's death, the secular nature of the state was weakened, and political parties have been more involved in religious matters. In recent years, the influence of religious parties has increased, and the government has introduced policies that are interpreted as being more conservative. The relationship between religion and politics in Turkey is complex and multifaceted, with various factions and interests vying for influence.

Religious and political parties in Turkey

Turkey has a vibrant political landscape with a diverse range of parties, including religious and secular parties. The Kemalist Party, founded by Atatürk, is one of the oldest political parties in the country and has a strong secular base. Other parties, such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP), have gained popularity in recent years and have been associated with religious policies and programs. The relationship between religion and politics in Turkey has evolved over time, reflecting the country's complex social and political dynamics.
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the concepts of 'Turk' and 'Muslim' is present. In this context, it is interesting to note that when confronted with a foreign practitioner of another religion, Turks, including Islamists, have no prejudice but are only interested in learning about foreign religious practices. On the other hand, Turkish converts to Christianity, ecumenically, are viewed as traitors and persecuted to an extent which has forced most of them to leave the country, according to the observations of several Catholic and Protestant priests. This circumstance seems to fit fairly well with the generally secular and tolerant character of the Turkish society, particularly as it is not paralleled in many Muslim societies. Indeed, many states with Muslim majority have no difficultly supporting sizeable but religiously differing minorities. Examples are the Christians in Indonesia or in Palestine, or the Hindus and Christians in Bangladesh. In Turkey, however, there seems to be a unique condition that 'Turks' can be sectarian 'Muslim' — and indeed, 99 per cent of the population are nominally Muslims. Non-Muslims are not viewed as Turks, even if they are Turkish citizens.

This attitude is interesting in historical view as the Ottoman Empire never was a fully Islamic state, but rather a flexible system able to respond to the needs of a multi-religious empire. As Ilter Turan has noted, 'Turk' designates an eminently political concept. Further, he notes that the concept of 'Muslim' is not related to whether the person is a believer or not, but to an Islamic ancestry, hence a cultural tradition. Even with the creation of the secular republic, perhaps even strengthened by it, the religious appearance was a necessary condition for membership of the political community. This factor is one which should be recalled when analysing the ideology of nationalism. Indeed, although it might seem paradoxical in view of recent events, this tendency was strengthened and given official sanction by the military coup in 1980. As the military were determined to crush left-wing nationalism and weaken right-wing nationalism, it encouraged the moderate increase of Islamic observance. This has been called a 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'.

Sufism

Sunni Islam is the majority form of Islam in Turkey, thought to be the belief of 70 to 80 per cent of the population. The bulk of the remaining 20-30 per cent is made up of the various Alevis. Smaller religious minorities are, in particular, Greek Orthodox (1,500), Armenians (40,000), Assyrian Christians (10,000) and Jews (19,000-26,000). Within the majority religion, Hanafite Sunni Islam, the importance of Sufi orders is not of underestimation, notably not in politics. The main Sufi order is the Naqshbandi, in Turkish Naksibendi. The Naqshbandi order posed from the early years of the republica direct threat to the state. In fact, Sufi orders were banned largely due to the identification of the Shaykh Said rebellion of 1923 with the Naqshbandiya.

The Naqshbandi order differs from many other Sufi orders in its relative lack of mysticism. Rather, it is characterized by sobriety and discipline. It is known for an 'forward-looking attitude' which differs significantly from smaller groups like the Aqimmeni, whose Sär (Ar. dhrak) forms of prayer are characterized by a significant level of mysticism. Simultaneously, as far as activism is concerned, the Naqshbandis are more active than other Sufis. This is the case precisely because other Sufi brotherhoods are largely interested in achieving closeness to, or even unity with, God by mystical means on an individual level. The Naqshbandis, on the other hand, follow the teachings of the Prophet more strictly and are more susceptible to polticalism. As the sociologist Şerif Mardin argues, 'the Naqshbandi order has always been alert for opportunities to use power for what is considered the higher interests of Muslims'. It has also always had elaborate instruments for political mobilisation. The Naqshbandi order, moreover, is not a homogenous unit. It is split into several wings, and this fragmentation is not totally counteracted even by its leaders. Rather, initiative by local leaders is encouraged and is one of the strengths of the order. The main sections of the order, believed to be followed by 2.5 million people, are the reportedly statist and nationalist Mensul (the aim), which is active in western Turkey; Çarsamba (Wednesday), active mainly in Istanbul and in organising religious education; and Ikender Pasha, reportedly critical of Erbakan, in central and western Turkey, which aims to infiltrate the administration in order to Islamise it.

During the twentieth century the Naqshbandi order in Turkey has been represented by two main figures. One was Mhemet Zadjhorko, a follower of the powerful nineteenth century Shaykh Ziaeddin Gümüşhanevi. Korko's circle in the 1960s included a number of key figures in Turkish society of later decades, including the Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan and president Turgut Ozal's brother Korkut Ozal, as well as Hası Aksoy and Fehmi Adak. Korko died in 1980 and was succeeded by Ekic Zsuna, a high-ranking professor of theology. The second main figure was Şef Ledizuma- man Said Nursi (1874-1960), who established relations with the Young Turks during the early part of the century. Nursi was, thus, very politised and began work in a situation which changed later, as he abandoned politics, believing that in any case religious mobilisation would have direct political consequences. Nursi was a travelling preacher, who realised that traditional theology was not relevant enough. He developed an interest in science and capitalised on education as the key to his movement. Said Nursi interpreted the Quran in the light of modernity in his Râfat-n-Nur (the Epistle of Light). Through this work, which is also disseminated through audio tapes, his teachings are spread. Associating with modernity, however, did not mean accepting the secular republic. In fact, Rainer Hermann
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Whereas, the Turkish constitution between Atatürk, the secularist and  

capitalist, and Kale, the rural, nationalist and socialist, proved to be a fractious relationship from the outset. Atatürk, the founder of the republic, sought to modernize Turkey while maintaining its Islamic roots. Kale, the leader of the Workers' Party (CHP), wanted to create a socialist society. The conflict between these two visions was evident in the early years of the republic, with Atatürk promoting secularism and Kale advocating for a more egalitarian society.

Recent events have once again highlighted the tension between the two visions. The government's decision to build a new capital city, Ankara, on the site of the old capital, Istanbul, has been met with resistance from Kale's supporters. The move is seen as an attempt to undermine the cultural and economic dominance of Istanbul, which has historically been the center of the country's political and economic life.

Turkey's economy has been struggling in recent years, with high inflation and a weak lira. This has led to increased demands for change, with some calling for a return to the more socialist policies of the past. The government has resisted these calls, arguing that it is necessary to maintain stability and attract foreign investment.

The political landscape is also becoming more complex, with the emergence of new parties and movements. The Workers' Party has remained a strong force, but there are also growing numbers of people who are disillusioned with the political system and are seeking new solutions.

In conclusion, the challenge facing Turkey is to find a way to reconcile the visions of Atatürk and Kale, while also addressing the needs of the people. This will require a commitment to social justice, economic equality, and political openness. The future of Turkey will depend on how well it can navigate these challenges, and how effectively it can create a society that is both modern and inclusive.
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A few words about the Alans and their role. Among the Ionians, we must mention the Alans, a people who lived in the region of Byzantium. The Ionians were the ancient inhabitants of the region, and the Alans were a nomadic people who migrated into the region from the north. The Ionians were known for their love of culture and the arts, while the Alans were known for their military prowess. The two peoples would clash over control of the region, leading to numerous battles and conflicts. The Ionians were ultimately victorious, and the Alans were forced to leave the region. However, their influence can still be seen today, with many places and people named after them.
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Alevi identity, heritage and culture have been built in these three areas since the 12th century. Alevi communities in Turkey, especially in the Konya, Sivas, and Erzurum regions, have a rich cultural heritage and a strong sense of identity. The Alevi community in Turkey is known for its unique religious practices and cultural traditions.

Alevi-Alevi relations with the Turkish state have been a subject of debate and controversy. While the Turkish government has taken steps to recognize and protect Alevi cultural heritage, there have been concerns about the erosion of Alevi identity and the assimilation of Alevi communities into Turkish society. The government has also faced criticism for not doing enough to protect Alevi cultural and religious institutions.

In recent years, the Turkish government has taken steps to address these concerns by establishing Alevi cultural institutions and promoting Alevi culture. However, there are still concerns about the future of Alevi identity and the potential for Alevi communities to maintain their cultural and religious traditions in the face of increasing societal pressures.

The Turkish government has also faced criticism for not doing enough to protect Alevi cultural and religious institutions. The government has not taken sufficient action to address these concerns, and there are still concerns about the future of Alevi identity and the potential for Alevi communities to maintain their cultural and religious traditions in the face of increasing societal pressures.
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chamber of commerce, perceived as a political threat by Demirel. In spite of this, Erbakan applied for membership of the Justice Party and wanted to run for parliamentary elections the same year. As Demirel vetoed Erbakan’s candidature, the latter stood as an independent and was easily elected. This was a great victory for Korkut, who had been looking to establish an Islamic party and had capitalised on believers’ disappointment in Demirel. As an informal section of the Justice Party centred around religious figures had formed in 1967, a good number of parliamentarians were in favour of Korkut’s plans. In January 1970, Erbakan and seventeen colleagues founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizami Partisi), which claimed to be founded on the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and of Atatürk’s war of liberation as well as on the just order preached by Islam.

However, the military ultimatum of 1971 led to the closure of the recently founded National Order Party. Erbakan fled to Switzerland, learning a fate similar to that of Menderes, but was asked to return by the military, mainly as he was useful as an instrument in weakening Demirel’s standing in the right. Hence in October 1972 the National Salvation Party (Milli Selçuk Partisi) was founded, although Erbakan did not assume the role of leader until the 1973 elections. These elections can be termed the breakthrough of political Islam in Turkey. The National Salvation Party received over 11 per cent of the votes. Still, the rise of the Islamists was not among the principal factors in Turkish politics of the time. Rather, it remained a peripheral factor as the country was hit by an economic and social crisis in the aftermath of the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, which was executed by a coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit. Ecevit, chairman of the Republican People’s Party, had staged an electoral success by retracting the left to a more standard social democratic rhetoric, gaining 33 per cent of the votes. However, Ecevit lacked a majority in parliament and could not form a government until the beginning of 1976—when Necmettin Erbakan as his coalition partner. This coalition was one of necessity, and as the political scientist Elizbet Tbudgja quotes an Islamic writer of the time, it resembled a dish made out of honey and garlic, original but not particularly tasty.

The economic and social crisis of the country only deepened with the loss of foreign aid and the increasing political and social instability. Erbakan managed to enter a new coalition in 1977 with Demirel and the party adopted nationalist, but his influence remained limited. The real struggle in Turkey was that between the extreme left and the extreme right. This controversy spilled over into street violence throughout the country which in its heyday claimed over twenty lives a day. The political instability with short-lived governments meant that the state power necessary to keep order was absent. This led to the military intervention of 1980, which was greeted with relief by the population. As mentioned above, the military administra-

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religion would counterbalance this tendency. Hence religious education was made obligatory in schools and the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ was born.

The man to carry it into practice turned out to be Turgut Özal. He was an engineer and economist of Kurdish origin who had been a candidate for the National Salvation Party in the 1970s. Özal managed to win the trust of the military authorities and was allowed to found an independent party, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) in time for the first free elections of 1983. In contrast, the Welfare Party, the continuation of the National Salvation Party, was not allowed to appear, and many of its supporters took a Motherland Party ticket instead. Özal engineered the Turkish economic boom of the 1980s, and was known as a taboo-breaker in all fields except one: religion. Growing from a family close to the Naşibiyyunlulu, Özal paid considerable attention to religious issues and, not unlike Menderes in his time, sponsored the Islamic revival of the 1980s. Unlike Menderes, however, Özal worked wonders with the economy, which might be one reason for the military toleration of his overtly pro-Islamic activities.

The representation of Islamic interests within the Motherland Party led to difficulties for the Islamists in organising themselves into a separate party. Hence the Welfare Party received less than 5 per cent in the municipal elections of 1984. Another reason, naturally, was that Erbakan was banned from politics by all major political leaders, including Demirel and Ecevit. This ban was lifted by a referendum in 1987, and immediately the Welfare Party won over 7 per cent of the votes in that year’s parliamentary election - but did not gain representation in parliament, as a 10 per cent threshold had been adopted in order to prevent small parties from playing the role they had played in the late 1970s. By now, the party strategy of the party had changed. Both the National Order Party and the National Salvation Party had used a clearly religious discourse, which was still defended by traditionalists within the Welfare Party. However, this discourse was not particularly attractive to new voters, and was a bit abstractly ideological to bring the party beyond an electoral support of 10–12 per cent.

In the 1980s, however, the Islamist leaders started to deal increasingly with worldly issues, such as administration and economics. At the same time, the party created a country-wide organisation which was neither challenged nor paralleled by any other party. Moreover, the party adopted a political agenda based on the concept of just orders, adil diince. On closer scrutiny, the concept of an Islamic social justice shows clear socialist undertones, notably in its criticism of the society created by the secular parties. The aim of this new image was clear: to create a popular movement, not an elite party with an ideological base. This process has been fruitful, but has also blurred the identity of the party, and come under criticism from the traditionalists. Hence the party has won tremendous support from the urban poor, a support which it earned by truly humanitarian actions, which in turn have been made possible by its
municipal elections, in which the Welfare Party unexpectedly came to power in the municipal administrations of, among other cities, Adana, Istanbul, Konya and Ankara. This success showed with great clarity how the Welfare Party’s popularity was based on the urban poor. Interestingly, the urban poor, especially recent migrants from the countryside, had historically been ardent supporters of the left and had been the cornerstone of Ecevit’s success in the 1970s. The transformation and division of the centre-left can thus be seen as a primary reason for the Welfare Party’s popularity. Indeed, the left has increasingly assumed the urban avant-garde identity, Kemalist and modern, but not in conjunction with the interests of the urban poor, who would be the most logical supporters of social democracy. Furthermore the competition between three centre-left parties in the early 1990s, now ‘only’ two, has increased the disillusionment of the electorate with the left. However, the result of this development is, in a sense, that the Welfare Party, as Ersin Kalayoğlu and Bülent Turan have remarked, can be termed a part of the ‘new left’.

The 1995 elections can be viewed in this light: a further loss of strength for the left and a leap forward for the Welfare Party. The two centre-left parties captured approximately 25 per cent, the Welfare Party over 21 per cent, and the two centre-right parties 40 per cent. In comparison with the late 1970s, it becomes clear that the Islamic growth has not occurred at the expense of the centre-right, as might be thought – the latter, as throughout republican history, commands about 40 per cent of the electorate – but the centre-left, whose support has hovered around 35 per cent, is now down to ten percentiles. This amounts exactly to the increase in support of the Islamic current: about ten percentiles.

The left in Turkey can be thought to have drawn its support from three main groups: first, the intellectual left, whose number must be relatively small though increasing as the middle class grows; second, the Alevi population which remains loyal mainly to Ecevit, including rural as well as urban, wealthy as well as worse-off elements; third, the (mainly) urban poor of Sunni denomination. This last group of former sympathizers of the left have clearly been the nucleus of the electoral success of the Welfare Party. This fact is corroborated by an opinion poll among Welfare Party voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Self-identification of Welfare Party Voters, 1997</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Democrat</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cumhuriyet, 24 October 1997.

‘Unwarranted influence’. According to this, according to an Islamic journalist, the United States has used satellites in order to spread its anti-Islamic propaganda in Turkey.
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The above suggests that half of the Welfare Party sympathisers clearly defined their political identity as Muslim. This corroborates the accepted view that the core Islamist support group hovered around 10 per cent of the electorate. However, it is the other half, those who describe themselves as Muslim Democrats (a term which deliberately parallels West European Christian democracies), that brought the Welfare Party to its position as the largest party in parliament and to power in the summer of 1996.

Once in power, the Welfare Party dropped most of its professed ambitions to revolutionise the state. Erdogan did sign several military agreements with Israel, probably in order not to alienate the military at an early stage, although before the elections Welfare Party officials had harshly criticised cooperation with Israel. However, once in power, the Islamisation of the state started. This had already occurred in the municipal administrations under Welfare Party control after the 1994 elections and had led to widespread protests from the secular establishment. As the level of Welfare Party domination in the coalition government, which was formed with the True Path Party (Adalet Partisi, the heir to Demirel's Justice Party) led by Tansu Ciller, increased, the military took up its role as watchdog of the secular republic. In February 1997, after a pro-sharia demonstration in the Ankara suburb of Sincan, growing resistance from the Islamist-led government led a mass movement orchestrated from military headquarters and supported by the secular establishment to oust the Welfare Party from power. In a remarkable well-planned flow of events during the spring of 1997, the government was finally forced to resign in August. Furthermore, the Welfare Party was banned by the constitutional court in January 1998 for agitation against the secular republic. Apparently, Kemalist forces have now secured their hegemony in Turkish politics.

However, the question is what will become of the genuinely popular movements that were the Welfare Party? The Welfare Party has indeed become a mass movement, but this does not mean that political Islam has been defeated in Turkey. The Islamic renaissance remains a fact, and some voices fear that the Islamist quest for power will be transferred from the parliament to the streets, and that Turkey will slide into a period of civil war as in the 1970s. Others maintain that the Welfare Party will be resurrected under a new name with a more centrist perspective, and will become a true Islamist party. Like the Christian democratic parties of Western Europe, this would lead to the alienation of extremist elements in the party, it would mean that the problem of religious extremism would persist or perhaps even increase to be the extreme, the extremist elements would be more of an irritation in society than a direct threat to the republic as the National Salvation Party and Welfare Party were perceived to be.

From another perspective, the Naqshbandi variant of political Islam can be said to have failed to consolidate its position in Turkish politics. During Ozal's era it acquired a significant position behind the scenes; and during Erdogan's time it achieved this position in the open, but through impatience it failed to sustain its position and experienced a substantial setback. Meanwhile the Nurcu movement is growing in strength and can be expected to profit from the failure of the Welfare Party, as Gulen's model constantly has been to seek accommodation with the secular state, not to act against it either openly or subversively. If the military is interested in perpetuating the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, it would seem logical for it to use Gulen as a partner. Perhaps this can be the solution to the severe troubles regarding Islam's place in Turkish society and politics. Yet some observers doubt Fetullah's real aims. Is the rhetoric of accommodation with secularism only a case of taktik? Is it, in other words, a tactic of dissimulation which will be reversed once the movement's power has increased? The answer to this question falls beyond the scope of this chapter, but the problem remains that Turkey has to find a way of reconciling the secular identity of the state with the Islamic traditions expressed by salafist sectors of its population. A perhaps simplistic approach, which nevertheless makes a great deal of sense in the conceptual sphere, was proposed by the political scientist Bassam Tibi: 'In Turkey there is a contradiction between Secularism and Islamism. If you manage to remove the "some" from the two terms, you may have come a long way in solving the contradiction'.

Literature

Chapter Seven

Turkic Central Asia

Robert M. McNeal and Ingrid Swartzberg

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In contrast to the states that have been independent republics since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are still formally part of the former Soviet Union. However, they have made significant strides towards independence, particularly in terms of their economies and political systems. The Central Asian republics have also begun to assert their sovereignty, particularly in the areas of energy and transportation. The modernization of these regions, particularly in terms of infrastructure and technology, is a significant area of investment for both the governments and the private sector. The Central Asian countries have also begun to look towards each other as potential partners, particularly in terms of trade and investment. This has led to the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics. The SCO has been a driving force in the development of Central Asia, particularly in terms of infrastructure and transportation. The economic growth in Central Asia has also led to significant changes in the region, particularly in terms of population migration and urbanization. The Central Asian countries have also begun to look towards the West as potential partners, particularly in terms of economic and political cooperation. The modernization of these regions, particularly in terms of infrastructure and technology, is a significant area of investment for both the governments and the private sector. The Central Asian countries have also been working to improve their relations with the United States, particularly in terms of security and energy cooperation. The future of Central Asia is likely to be shaped by the continued development of these countries, as well as by the changing global political landscape.