The dissolution of the Ottoman empire was one of the more complex cases in the transition from eighteenth-century Islamic imperial societies to modern national states. The Ottoman regime was suzerain over a vast territory, including the Balkans, Turkey, the Arab Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa. Its influence reached Inner Asia, the Red Sea, and the Sahara. While the empire had gone through a period of decentralization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had begun to give ground to its European political and commercial competitors, it retained its political legitimacy and its basic institutional structure. In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans restored the power of the central state, consolidated control over the provinces, and generated the economic, social, and cultural reforms that they hoped would make them effective competitors in the modern world.

While the Ottomans struggled to reform state and society, the empire was slowly being dismembered. For survival the Ottomans depended increasingly upon the European balance of power. Until 1878 the British and the Russians offset each other and generally protected the Ottoman regime from direct encroachment. Between 1878 and 1914, however, most of the Balkans became independent and Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary all acquired control of Ottoman territories. The dismemberment of the Ottoman empire culminated at the end of World War I in the creation of Turkey and a plethora of new states in the Arab Middle East. As in the case of Iran, the effects of European intervention would mingle with the Ottoman institutional and cultural heritage to generate a number of different modern Middle Eastern societies.

THE PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

By the end of the eighteenth century the Ottoman empire could no longer defend itself against the growing military power of Europe, or ward off European com-
Black Sea, while Britain, after helping defeat Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, became the paramount military and commercial power in the Mediterranean. Russia wanted to absorb Ottoman territories in the Balkans and win access to the Mediterranean; Britain wanted to shore up the empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion and protect its commercial and imperial interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and India. Thus, the Ottoman empire was precariously protected by the balance of European power. The stage was set for the century-long struggle over the "sick man" of Europe.

The first test of the balance of power came with the invasion of Syria in 1831 by Muhammad 'Ali, the independent Ottoman governor of Egypt (1805–48). In response, Russia and the Ottomans concluded the treaty of Unkia Skelessi (July 1833), in which they agreed to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign warships. Britain, threatened by the specter of a Russian protectorate over the Ottomans and possible Russian intervention in the Mediterranean, declared for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire and the restoration of Syria to Ottoman control. In 1840, Russia, Britain, and Austria agreed that Muhammad 'Ali would have to retreat from Syria, and framed a new convention regulating passage through the straits. The powers agreed that no warships were to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in time of peace. Both Russia and Britain would be protected in their spheres of influence. By a supplementary agreement in 1841, the powers allowed Muhammad 'Ali to establish a hereditary regime in Egypt. Thus, the internal crisis of the empire led to a concert of European powers to regulate Ottoman affairs. The Ottoman empire had become a protectorate of Europe and a pawn of the great powers.

The balance of power and the durability of the Ottoman empire were again tested in the Crimean war, 1853–56. Provoked by Russian demands for influence in Jerusalem and a protectorate over all Ottoman Christian subjects, British, French, and Ottoman forces entered the Black Sea and took Sevastopol in 1855. By the treaty of Paris (1856) the Russians were forced to dismantle their naval forces on the Black Sea, but they were compensated by an agreement to make Romania an autonomous province under Ottoman suzerainty.

The next crisis was the revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1876 against Ottoman rule. Nationalist resistance to Ottoman rule in the Balkans had begun with the Serbian revolt of 1804–13. Between 1821 and 1829, Greece gained its independence. Serbians, Romanians, and Bulgarians also demanded autonomy. The Balkan campaigns for independence culminated in 1876 with Russian intervention. By the treaty of San Stefano (1878), the Ottomans were forced to concede the independence of Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro. The huge Russian gains provoked the other European powers to call a congress of European states at Berlin in 1878. At the Congress of Berlin a new settlement was imposed. Bessarabia was ceded by the Ottomans to Russia, but in compensation for Russian gains, Austria "temporarily" occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Britain obtained the use of
The modern transformation: nineteenth and twentieth centuries

Cyprus as a base of operations. Bulgaria was reduced to a small state and Ottoman power in the Egyptian desert, and the Suez Canal was under British control. Britain had moved its fleet in the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, as part of its policy of preventing the Ottoman advance to the Suez Canal and the eastern Mediterranean. The British and French fleets met off Crete and the Dodecanese Islands, resulting in the Battle of the Dardanelles.

By 1918, the Ottoman Empire had been weakened by internal divisions and external pressures, and the Allies were able to take advantage of this situation. On November 10, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed the Armistice of Mudros, which marked the end of its existence as a distinct entity.

The Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, formally recognized the independence of the Ottoman Empire, which was to be divided into several smaller states. However, the Treaty was never fully implemented, and the Turkish resistance to these provisions led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

The modern transformation continued in the next century, with the victorious World War II and the Cold War. The history of the modern era is marked by the rise of the United States as a global superpower and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. The world has not been the same since.
was set up to publish translations of European technical, military, and geographical works. Selim III (1789–1807) introduced the first comprehensive reform program, called the Nizamat-e Jidid, or New Organization, encompassing a modern army corps, increased taxation, and technical schools to train cadres for the new regime. Selim’s program, however, was defeated by the opposition of the ‘ulama’ and the janissaries, and he was deposed in 1807.

In the decades that followed, Russian advances in the Caucasus, the rise to power of Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt, and the Greek war for independence again made the need for reform urgent. Under Mahmud II (1807–39) the reform program was revived. While Mahmud’s program of military, administrative, and educational projects began on the base pioneered by Selim III, the new effort to improve military capabilities, rationalize administration, subordinate the provinces, raise revenues, and establish schools was guided by a strong Western orientation and a more radical concept of a centralized state, governed by an absolute monarch. The reforms were intended to revivify the absolute authority of the Ottoman rulers supported by new elites who were technically proficient and entirely devoted to the authority of the regime. Conservative resistance was utterly crushed. In 1826 the entire janissary corps was destroyed and feudal tenures were partially abolished. The ‘ulama’ were weakened by the absorption of many waqf endowments, courts, and schools into new state-controlled ministries. The Bektashi religious order, associated with the janissaries, was dissolved. There would henceforth be little opposition to reform — and even considerable support from the higher-ranking ‘ulama’.

This first phase of reform was followed by the Tanzimat, or Reorganization period, which lasted from 1839 to 1876. In this period the reform program was extended from military and administrative matters to economic, social, and religious affairs. As the Ottomans realized that radical changes in economy and society were needed to support a centralized state, they built factories to manufacture cloth, paper, and guns. Coal, iron, lead, and copper mining were encouraged. To stimulate agriculture, the government undertook reclamation and resettlement. Technological modernization included the introduction of a postal system (1834), telegraph (1855), steamships, and the beginning of railroad construction in 1866. Government monopolies were ended in 1838, and international commerce was stimulated by low tariffs. Though reforms in trade and banking enabled European traders and investors to achieve a dominant position in the Ottoman economy, the principle that a more productive economy was essential for state finances was established.

Important legal reforms were also undertaken. New law codes were promulgated to meet the demands of a new administration and economy, and to respond to the political pressure generated by Ottoman subjects and foreign powers. New commercial and penal codes regulating landowning and commerce were promulgated to supplement Shari’a legal principles. Western types of law courts and law codes were introduced as early as 1840. Laws of 1858 established private ownership of land. In 1870 the Ottoman government issued a new civil code, the Meğelle, which in substance followed the Shari’a, but nonetheless dramatically departed from tradition because it contained changes made on the personal authority of the Sultan and was administered in state rather than in Shari’a courts. The family law of 1917, by adopting a European system of personal law, made a complete break with the Muslim past.

While Ottoman educational reform began with the establishment of professional schools, a new education system, including elementary and secondary schools, was created to prepare students for higher technical education. In 1847 the Ministry of Education undertook to organize middle schools (rüşdîye); the army created a parallel system of secondary schools. After the Crimean war, the Ministry of Education and the army began experiments in elementary education, introducing arithmetic, geography, and Ottoman history. In 1870 the first efforts were made to create a university to integrate professional, humanistic, and religious studies. Much of the program, however, remained a paper system.

Similarly, extensive reforms were made in the administration of the non-Muslim populations. While Christians and Jews formed autonomous religious communities which administered their own civil laws, the nationalist revolts made it imperative to further integrate the Christian populations and win their loyalty for the Ottoman regime. The first Ottoman response to these pressures was the Hatt-i Şerif (Noble Rescript) of Gülhane (1839), a declaration of principles of government, recognizing the rights of life, property, and honor, and the equality of all religious groups before the law. In 1856 the Hatt-i Humayun (Imperial Rescript) promised equality for non-Muslims and guaranteed their right to serve in the army. In 1867 Christians began to be appointed to state councils.

The non-Muslim communities were also reorganized to shift power from clergy to laity. In 1850 the newly formed Protestant millet was governed by an assembly of lay members rather than by clergy. In 1863, the Gregorian Armenians were granted the right to form a national assembly with a lay majority and to elect patriarchs and councils. The Ottoman government forced the Greek clergy to form a lay assembly and then separated the Bulgarian from the Greek Orthodox Church. Behind the reorganization of the Christian communities under lay leadership was the goal of integrating the Muslim and non-Muslim populations into an Ottoman nation. No longer would religious differences be a barrier to Ottoman loyalty.

Transcending the statism of the first reforms, the Tanzimat amounted to a change in the very concept of Ottoman society. It repudiated the autonomous functioning of Islamic educational and judicial institutions, and challenged the very concept of Muslim supremacy. In the interest of a strong state, and the integration of its various religious and ethnic populations, the Ottoman authorities were tampering with the fundamental structures of Muslim society and replacing traditional educational, legal, and religious systems with secular organizations. The restoration of the empire was beginning to have revolutionary implications.

The state reforms proved revolutionary because they brought into being a new elite committed to still further change. While the Tanzimat did not deeply penetrate Ottoman society, or affect the masses of people whose lives, beliefs, and loyalties
were still bound up with Islam. It created a "new class." With the destruction of the political power of the Ottomans, the weakening of the 'ulama, and the adop-
tion of the reforms programs, the weakening of the Ottoman empire continued. The new state, however, was unwilling to tolerate the old bureaucratic structure and the war office. This group of bureaucrats, who began their careers in religious schools and had then entered the newly reorganized administrative service of Mehmed II and had by the "new class," occupied government offices, made up of the middle and professional schools blocked the entrenched old generation turned their energies to literacy. Becoming poets, writers, journalists, and editors of opposition newspapers, were committed at once to the cause of the Ottoman empire. The Ottomans, dazzled by the successes of Iran, favored a constitutional regime in which they could not survive unless it became rooted in the masses. Moreover, a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for. The Young Turks, with their emphasis on a modern organization of society and a constitutional government, they held that a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that the Young Turks stood for.
In bitter reaction to the Islamic veneer of the reign of 'Abd al-Hamid, the CUP was resolutely secular. Between 1913 and 1918 it adopted a program of aggressive secularization of schools, courts, and law codes, and passed the first measures for the emancipation of women. In 1916 the CUP government reduced the powers of the Shaykh al-Islam, transferred jurisdiction over Muslim courts to the Ministry of Justice, and control of Muslim colleges to the Ministry of Education. In 1917 a new family code based on European principles was promulgated. While the regime of 'Abd al-Hamid had been bolstered by appeals to Islam, the opposition intelligentsia moved from the Young Ottoman position, which synthesized Islam and constitutionalism, to a more radically secular position. The struggle for power among the various segments of the Ottoman governing elite and intelligentsia led to a radicalization of the reform program along secularist lines.

The CUP program was Ottoman and secularist, but it was also increasingly Turkish-oriented. Between 1908 and 1918 the idea of Ottoman reform was overtaken by a new concept. CUP leaders began to conceive of the Ottoman empire in terms of Turkish nationality. For more than a century, Christians had pursued national goals and demanded that peoples who shared an ethnic, linguistic, and religious heritage have a territorial state of their own. By the late nineteenth century there were already several Christian nations – Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro – in what had once been the domains of the Ottoman empire. Albania was soon to revolt, and Armenians were claiming territorial autonomy. For the Christians, it was easy to form a national identity in opposition to Muslim and Ottoman domination and in frank emulation of the Christian nations in the West. For the Muslims, however, it was difficult to disentangle nationalism from Islam and from the Ottoman empire. They could make no ready distinction between Muslim interests and Ottoman authority. Furthermore, the peoples we now call Turks had no concept of themselves as an ethnic group. They thought of themselves either as Muslims or as subjects of the Sultan. The word “Turk” only meant peasant, nomad, or rural bumpkin – someone without education.

Still, the idea of a Turkish nation began to take shape in the late Ottoman era. Loyalty to Islam and to the Ottoman empire came to be considered a kind of patriotism, described by the word ʿuṭan, or fatherland. Pan-Islamic identifications inspired a sense of political unity. Muslim and Ottoman vocabularies could thus express a political concept akin to, but not identical with, the national ideal. A Turkish cultural consciousness also began to take shape. Young Ottoman writers were concerned with the reform of the Turkish language and the adaptation of the high-cultural style of Ottoman Turkish for mass use. In the 1890s, under the stimulus of European students of Turkish language and culture, and of Crimean and Inner Asian intellectuals who were refugees or students in Istanbul, the Ottomans were introduced to the idea of the “Turkish people.” The press glorified Anatolia as the homeland of Turks, and peasants as the backbone of a Turkish nation. The Turkish idea was being propagated by literary clubs such as the Turkish Homeland Society and the Turkish Hearth. These organizations waged a “national” campaign to simplify the Turkish language, make it more accessible to the masses, and persuade the populace of its own Turkish nationality. Ziya Gokalp (1875–1924) emerged as the spokesman of Turkish nationalism. Without regrets for the declining Ottoman empire, he celebrated the folk culture of the Turkish people, and called for the reform of Islam to make it expressive of the Turkish ethos. 'Abdallah Ijevdet (1869–1932) presented a secular basis for Turkish nationalism. The Turkish concept made it possible to define a new civilization which embodied the historical identity of the Turkish people but was not Muslim, and was modern but not Western.

Between 1908 and 1918 political events put an end to the possibility of a multinational, multi-religious Ottoman empire, and made the Turkish idea more relevant. By 1908 the majority of the Christian population was already independent. Albania revolted in 1910 and its autonomy was conceded in 1912. The Balkan wars then stripped the Ottoman empire of virtually all of its European possessions, and during World War I the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia was decimated by the hardships of war, deportation, and Turkish and Kurdish massacres. Even among Muslims, Kurdish and Arab national feeling was growing, and there were Arab conspiracies against the empire. By the end of World War I all that was left of the Ottoman empire was Anatolia, with its majority Turkish population, and Kurdish and small Armenian minorities. The realities of Ottoman political life now corresponded to the nationalist concept of a Turkish people. The war had cut the Gordian knot of Ottoman loyalties by stripping away most of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations. It also left the remaining territories of the empire occupied and divided among the allied powers.

After the war Mustafa Kemal carried the principles of the Young Turk generation into action. Under Kemal’s leadership, the national elite was able to mobilize the Turkish masses to fight against foreign occupation and to support the national idea. Kemal organized the movement for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, established a Grand National Assembly at Ankara (1920), promulgated a new constitution (1921), and established a republican regime in most of Anatolia. The new regime defeated the Armenian republic in the Caucasus, the French in Cilicia, and the Greeks in central Anatolia, and in 1923 the European powers agreed, by the treaty of Lausanne, to recognize the independence of Turkey in its present boundaries. Turkey alone of the Muslim-populated regions of the Middle East emerged from World War I as a fully independent country. Already provided with a national intelligentsia of army officers, experienced administrators, politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals, and a unified national movement, modern Turkey came into being with a coherent state structure, a unified elite, and a strong sense of its cultural and political identity.

The dominance of Ottoman military and bureaucratic elites, their turn toward nationalism, and their absolute leadership in the creation of the Turkish Republic may be better understood in terms of the historical weakness of alternative national
elites. The turn toward a concept of a secular national state was abetted by the inability of Ottoman religious leaders to articulate an effective Muslim opposition. The destruction of the janissaries and the weakening of the 'ulama' in 1826 proved decisive. After that the 'ulama' continued to support the Ottoman state, the defender of Islam. The Sultan was still considered the religious chief of Muslim peoples. Selim III and Mahmud II built mosques and tombs, attended mosque prayers and Sufi ceremonies, and appointed religious teachers for the soldiers. 'Abd al-Hamid revived the identification of Sultan and Caliph, and based his authority on the claim that he was the padishah of the Ottomans and the Caliph of all Muslims. The Ottoman state was able to persuade Muslim opinion that the empire, despite its apparent assault on Islamic educational and legal institutions and its willingness to grant political and economic equality to non-Muslims, was still a Muslim regime.

Furthermore, many leading 'ulama' were sympathetic to the need to make Islam effective in the modern world. Spokesmen for an Islamic modernism continued to believe in the validity of their faith, but felt that it had to be revised to make it compatible with changing conditions. On one side, they opposed the traditionalists who failed to recognize the importance of the new military, economic, and technical civilization of the West. On the other side, they opposed the secularists who did not value the religious and communal inspiration of Islam. The Islamic modernists wished to persuade the traditionalists to accept modernization as consistent with Islam, and persuade the modernists to accept Islam as a moral force. The Ottoman reform program, then, was presented in a framework of loyalty to Islam and of shared concern for the adaptation of Islamic values to the modern world.

Moreover, the 'ulama' remained loyal to the Ottoman regime because they were the servants of the state and were committed to an ideology of obedience. Leading 'ulama' were also personal friends of the Sultan, enjoyed his financial favors, and were connected by family ties to the military and bureaucratic elites. Through the middle decades of the nineteenth century the only religious opposition came from lower-ranking functionaries, theological students, and rural Sufis. At the end of the century, when the initiative passed to the radical secularists, Muslim religious leaders were not in a position to resist. The tradition of subservience to state initiative, and the ambivalent recognition of the need for modernizing reforms, made it impossible for them to oppose the powerful forces, national and international, that led toward the dissolution of the Ottoman empire.

Nor did the Ottoman military and bureaucratic elites have to contend with a Muslim bourgeoisie or commercial middle class. In part this was due to the legacy of state domination of the society and in part to European economic penetration of the Ottoman empire. The Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1858, which led to the removal of Ottoman monopolies and high tariffs, marked the full integration of the Ottoman empire into the international economy. Entry into world markets stimulated the production of cash crops such as grain, wool, raisins, tobacco, and opium, though cotton declined owing to American competition. By 1913 Anatolian agriculture provided 55 percent of the agricultural income of the Ottoman empire and 48 percent of the gross domestic product. Some 80 to 85 percent of exports were agricultural products.

Manufacturing also prospered. Though the trade treaty of 1858 is usually taken to have been a disaster for Turkish handicrafts, in fact Turkish cloth weaving and carpet making flourished in the nineteenth century, partly owing to investments by Austrian and British firms in a putting-out system of production. Industries, however, were very little developed except for state-owned factories which produced guns, clothing, and footwear for the soldiers, and sold the surplus to the general public. Ottoman efforts to create their own industries for cotton, textiles, iron, and weapons had limited prospects in the face of the high costs of imported raw materials and technicians. Nevertheless, Ottoman industrial output grew at a rate of 1.85 percent a year, about twice the rate of growth of the gross domestic product. In all, Ottoman engagement in the world economy led to intensified production for export, but to the failure of domestic industries and crafts in competition with Europe.

Ottoman engagement in the world economy also led to state indebtedness and financial dependency. The first Ottoman loans were contracted in 1854, and Ottoman economic development came to depend upon European loans for the construction of railroads, mining, and public utilities. Foreign capital also financed military expenditures and the formation of Ottoman banks. By 1882 the Ottoman state could no longer pay the interest on its debts and was forced to accept a foreign debt administration. Henceforth foreign bankers controlled the Ottoman economy. However, from 1880 to 1914 there was increased prosperity in the Ottoman empire owing to the centralization of state power, security in the provinces, and the foreign stimulus to internal investment and trade.

This foreign-stimulated and foreign-regulated economy had important consequences for the social structure of Ottoman society. It favored Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and other minorities involved in international trade, but the dependence of the Ottoman empire on the world economy did not change the distribution of political power within Ottoman society. These groups could not challenge the state elites. Control of taxation, major investments, and ideological and military power remained the prerogative of the Ottoman establishment. On the eve of the formation of the Turkish Republic, the military and administrative elites alone determined the destiny of the state.

REPUBLICAN TURKEY

Thus, the Ottoman tradition of a strong centralized state and military leadership was transmitted to the Turkish Republic. The history of modern Turkey can be divided into two phases. The period from 1921 to 1950 was the era of presidential dictatorship, religious reform, and the first stages of industrialization. From 1950 to the present is the era of a dual military rule and multi-party political system, increasing social differentiation, rapid economic change, and resumed ideological conflict.
The Kemalist period began in 1921, with the Law of Fundamental Organization which declared the sovereignty of the Turkish people. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk declared himself president of the Republic of Turkey. The regime, which continued until 1930, aimed to modernize and secularize society. The reforms included the abolition of the sultanate, the introduction of the Latin script, and the replacement of Arabic and Persian script with Turkish script. The Ottoman system of education was replaced with a secular system, and women were granted equal rights with men. The Kemalist regime also promoted the idea of a Turkish nation-state, which was based on the idea of a single nation with common language, culture, and religion. This was achieved through the promotion of the use of the Turkish language and the encouragement of nationalistic sentiments among the Turkish people. The Kemalist period is often regarded as a period of rapid modernization and progress, but it was also characterized by political repression and human rights abuses. Ataturk was assassinated in 1938, and his legacy continues to be a source of debate and controversy in Turkey today.
The economic development of the postwar Turkish Republic was dominated by a corporatist elite with a monopoly of political power committed to transforming and modernizing Turkish society. When Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, the regime continued under his loyal colleagues, Ismet Inonu (1938–50). The period between Kemal's death and the end of the Inonu era was marked by economic growth and industrialization. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s brought new challenges and opportunities for Turkey's economic development.
Bulent Ecevit came to represent the bureaucratic, intellectual, and technical elite of the country, including industrial workers and other urban groups. The party of Mustafa Kemal maintained its statist orientation, but became, in effect, a democratic socialist party appealing to a professional civil service and industrial clientele. The Justice Party, led by Sulayman Demirel, was heir to the legacy of the Democrat Party. It was oriented to large-scale private enterprise and rural development. Alongside the two major parties, new parties formed on both right and left, including the Agrarian Capitalists Democratic Party, the small-town petit bourgeois Islamist National Salvation Party, the elitist and fascist National Movement Party, and the Turkish Workers’ Party and other left-wing worker, Maoist, and Soviet-oriented groups. By the late 1970s the right wing was openly at war with leftist groups. The parliamentary system failed to mediate among these conflicting interests, and again, in 1980 the army intervened to restore political and economic order. In effect, economic and cultural development has made Turkey a highly pluralistic society which lacks effective political means to give coherent economic and ideological direction to the development of the country.

In 1983, under the eyes of a watchful army and with a new constitution, the government was again returned to civilian hands under the presidency of Turgut Ozal (1983–93). The vigilance of the military was institutionalized in the National Security Council which gives the army a powerful role in the formulation of government policy and a veto over policies of which it disapproves. The new constitution is authoritarian and outlawed parties based on class, religion, and ethnicity, and restricts freedom of the press and rights of labor organization.

The 1980s also brought a return to liberal economic policies and export-based growth. Import-substitution development — that is, development based on an industrial infrastructure shielded from international competition, catering to consumer needs, and a welfare or clientism policy using industry to provide employment for government officials, managers, and workers, welfare and other services — became too costly to sustain. State intervention was reduced, foreign investment welcomed, and private enterprise encouraged. Minority interests in the Turkish airline and in hotels and telecommunications have been sold to investors. Nonetheless, the state continues to subsidize housing, and to provide benefits for the military, bureaucrats, and other favored groups. The liberalized economy remains vulnerable due to the inability of the government to effectively tax the wealthy, curb its own expenditures, or control inflation.

While economically productive, this transformation has imposed economic hardship and insecurity upon downsized segments of the population. The result is a cultural and political counter-attack in two forms: Islamism and Kurdish nationalism.

Islamic revival and Kurdish nationalism

Islam holds a nuanced place in Turkish society. The ideology of the republic is secular, and the Turkish urban educated upper classes consider Islam a symbol of backwardness. The urban 'ulama' tradition has largely been destroyed, and has no
population within the system. The initial policy of the Republic was to institute formal education in state-sponsored institutions like religious schools, allowing voluntary religious courses in schools.

In the 1950s, the government also expanded religious education through religious schools, and encouraged Islam as a personal religious practice. Post-World War II, Turkey continued to carry on with the process of modernization and secularization, especially under the leadership of President Atatürk.

During this period, the number of people who identified as Muslim increased significantly. The government's efforts to promote secularism and modernization were reflected in the education system, which included religious education in the curriculum. The government also encouraged the use of the Turkish language and the development of a modern Turkish identity.

In the 1970s, the government continued to promote secularization and modernization, but this was met with resistance from those who sought to maintain traditional values. The government's efforts were also met with criticism from those who believed that the policies were not inclusive of all religious and cultural groups.

The government's policies were aimed at creating a modern Turkish identity, but this often came at the expense of traditional religious practices. The government's efforts to promote secularism were seen by some as a threat to the traditional values of society.

In recent years, the government has continued to promote secularism and modernization, but the issue of religion and politics remains a contentious one in Turkey. The government's policies have been met with resistance from those who believe that the policies are not inclusive of all religious and cultural groups.

In conclusion, the government's policies have had a significant impact on the education system and the modernization of Turkey. However, the issue of religion and politics remains a contentious one, and the government's efforts to promote secularism and modernization have been met with resistance from those who believe that the policies are not inclusive of all religious and cultural groups.
the Bosniak Muslims, because of the danger of a polarization into a Muslim—Bosniak–Albanian–Turkish coalition versus an eastern Christian—Serbian–Greek–Russian entente. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey attempted to assert its leadership for a new group of independent and underdeveloped nations. It promoted a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council, made extensive investments in the infrastructure of the new Central Asian republics, promoted student exchanges, and took part in the creation of a new western alphabet for Central Asian Turkic languages. In this region, Turkey’s influence, however, is relatively limited. Turkish initiatives have been checked by Russia which considers itself the patron power of the former Soviet states. Russia and Turkey remain rivals for the development of alternative pipeline routes for the export of regional oil and gas. Its relations with Russia are also constrained by the Kurdish problem. Russia sponsored conferences of exiled Kurds as a warning against Turkish intervention in Chechnya and the former Soviet republics. Vis-à-vis the Arab world, Turkey has several times invaded northern Iraq to try to crush the PKK. Turkey threatens to divert the Euphrates water supply and has developed ties with Israel to forestall Syrian support for the Kurds.

The Turkish modernist dream of integration into Europe is undermined by its responses to the Kurdish problem. Though Turkey is a member of the European Customs Union, and though 52 percent of Turkish exports go to and 44 percent of its imports come from the European Union countries, Turkey is held on probation or membership in the EU, many of whose members are critical of Turkey’s undemocratic constitution and its human rights abuses. There are, of course, other factors in this opposition. Greece resists Turkish participation. Germany fears opening up to Turkish labor migration, and there may also be an unspoken reluctance to accept a Muslim country as part of Europe.

Militant secularist opinion in Turkey refuses to accept the legitimacy of either Islamic religious commitments or separate ethnic identities. In the high tensions of the 1990s, the army reverted to a rigidly authoritarian and secularist policy. It forced the Refah Party to relinquish its place in the government. The courts have declared it illegal, and some of its leaders have been prosecuted or banned from politics. A new group, the Virtue Party, has succeeded Refah, but its influence and voter appeal seems to have declined. Furthermore, the military opposes Kurdish demands for autonomy as a threat to the survival of the Turkish state, and so justifies tight police control over the country, and widespread human rights abuses. The military also opposes political and legal system liberalization, and implements loose government controls over the media and the schools in order to maintain the secular, authoritarian Kemalist heritage. Thus, Islamic and Kurdish interests are largely excluded from the political process.

The polarization of Turkish society among secularists, Islamists, and Kurds calls into question its national identity. Behind the army’s resistance to Muslim or Kurdish political and cultural demands and its repressive policies lies a concept of the “Turkish nation as a unitary, homogeneous entity. Turkish nationalists do not allow for minority rights or for plural ethnic and cultural identities, and Turkey seems to be committed to the assimilation and homogenization of the population regardless of its diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Embedded, then, in the issue of Islam and Kurdish rights is the issue of Turkey’s political identity. The repressive policies of the government and the Kurdish and Islamic challenges to its authority test Turkey’s commitment to democratic and parliamentary government and the rights of citizens.

The formation of the Turkish Republic was prepared by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman empire. The republican bureaucratic and military elite committed to the secular modernization of the country was a direct outgrowth of the late Ottoman elite. The defeat of Islamic interests and their subordination to state control was similarly the result of the subordination of the religious establishment and the acceptance by the ‘ulama’ of the intrinsic legitimacy of the Ottoman regime. Furthermore, European intervention worked to strip away the Balkan Christian populations, and World War I led to the partition of the Ottoman empire in a way that substantially resolved the historical tensions between tribal and ethnic minorities and the Ottoman government. In the twentieth century, Turkish economic and social change has led to a highly pluralistic, secularized, and national society, but one in which Islam and Kurdish ethnicity continue to have profound religious and social meaning for much of the Turkish population. The conflicts created by Turkish pluralism have become a test of the nation’s modern identity.